

Dissent, Repression, and Inconsistency

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States of all kinds repress dissent – both violent and non-violent protest. What are the effects of such repression? Much attention has been devoted to understanding whether repression increases or decreases dissent in general and whether repression of specific protest strategies (violent or non-violent) can induce dissidents to change tactics. Findings have been mixed, with support found for both the ideas that repression quells dissent and encourages it, and that when targeted at a specific kind of dissent, repression can make dissidents change tactics.ⁱⁱ Although these existing works all focus on the importance of repression by the state, none look systematically at *how* this repression takes place. To date, studies of the effect of repression largely ignore the extreme variation in consistency with which states repress dissenters. States frequently respond in what appears to be an erratic fashion to dissidents, sometimes ignoring their activities and other times repressing the same activities ruthlessly.

In this chapter, we enter the debate about the effects of repression, looking specifically at the “substitution hypothesis” which is that repression of violent or non-violent dissent can induce dissidents to switch tactics. We argue that the effects of repression in this context will be conditional on the consistency with which states employ repression. We test this empirically on event data from dissent and repression in Europe. The novelty of this approach is twofold. First, the role of consistency has largely been ignored in studies of dissent behavior and we will fill a critical gap by examining it here.ⁱⁱⁱ Second, most of the literature on dissent examines the choice to use violence as dichotomous – dissidents are violent or not. We focus on the related choices to use violent and non-violent tactics by dissidents, allowing for the possibility of a mixed strategy of dissent. There is no reason to think that dissidents will not use both violent and non-violent tactics at the same time. Thus we frame our research question to ask: How does the use of repression affect dissident

choices to use more or less violent or non-violent dissent? By allowing for dissidents to mix types of dissent in their overall strategy, we gain a more accurate understanding of how repression affects dissent behavior.

The chapter proceeds as follows. We present the theory in three steps. First, we introduce a basic Rational Actor (RA) model which lays out how dissidents make strategic decisions about how to challenge the state.^{iv} In this model, dissidents weigh the costs and benefits of dissent as they determine how much effort to put into violent and non-violent tactics. The state is assumed to be the main source of the costs and benefits that inform dissident choices. Second, we introduce the concept of consistency of repression, explaining why states are likely to be inconsistent and how this will affect dissident choices about protest behavior. The predominant sources of inconsistency in states' repressive behavior are the diversity of aims states have and the principle-agent problem associated with using a military or police force to repress citizens. We then argue that the effect of repression on dissent will be conditional on the consistency with which it is used and we specify hypotheses that follow from our theory. Following this, we provide empirical evidence through a quantitative study of minority dissent in Europe and a qualitative examination of dissent in Northern Ireland. The final section offers concluding thoughts.

A Theory of Dissent Choice

Disaffected citizens protest in a number of ways, for example lobbing bombs into buildings, hunger strikes, marches, or sit-ins. Some protest tactics entail purposeful violence against the state while others are expressly non-violent. For example, Basque separatists have engaged in bombing campaigns and hostage taking, but also use non-violent mass

demonstrations to press their demands on the Spanish state. How do dissidents choose which tactics to use and to what extent they mix between violent and non-violent protest?

In order to make that decision, they consider both the potential costs and benefits of specific dissent tactics (i.e. the expected utility) and compare these costs and benefits across available tactics. Following Lichbach, we assume both the absolute and relative costs and benefits associated with each type of dissent are determined by the state.^v The cost of dissent is incurred via state repression and some fixed costs of resources and time.^{vi} Benefits also emanate from the state in the form of accommodation, and while we believe accommodation is important for groups to consider when determining strategies of dissent, we assume that the effects of accommodation on strategy are independent of the effects of repression; therefore we focus solely on repression in this chapter.

Actors, Tactics and Goals

Dissidents. Dissidents are some subset of the population with a grievance against the state who have chosen to protest. We conceive of dissident grievance in terms of some preferred policy outcome that differs from the state's preference. The particular policy may vary across cases, but all dissidents seek some policy change. Again following on Lichbach, we assume that dissidents act in a cohesive and coordinated manner. Lichbach uses the notion of a "team" to think about choices made by the group.^{vii} Dissident elites determine the overall strategy of the group, and the activities are then carried out by individuals in the group.

Once the decision to protest has been made, dissident elites must decide what kinds of tactics to use. We allow dissidents two basic options: violent or non-violent dissent.^{viii} The chosen mix of dissent tactics will be based on the tactics' expected costs and benefits,

with dissidents attempting to minimize costs and maximize benefits. Because part of the cost of dissent is paid when the state *responds* to dissident activity with repression, dissidents must make an informed guess about the likely costs of dissent tactics. Previous treatments of this basic Rational Actor model of dissent choice have assumed that the costs associated with dissent are known, but we raise the question of how dissidents might actually make this estimation of the costs of their actions.

Here, we propose that tactical choices about dissent are made through a dynamic process in which dissidents estimate both the amount of repression the state will employ and the likelihood that repression will be incurred for any particular instance of dissent. Thus, dissidents use a process of updating to adjust their expectations about the costs of violent and non-violent dissent tactics. To do this, dissidents look at two factors related to the past behavior of the state – how strong the repressive responses have been to a particular dissent tactic and how consistently the state has employed this response.

The State. The state is also assumed to act in a somewhat cohesive manner and seeks to maintain the status quo against which dissidents protest.^{ix} State elites make decisions about the level of repression that will be used in response to a particular instance of dissent, and agents of the state employ the determined level of repression. As we elaborate in the next section, slippage between the principle (the state) and its agent (security forces employing repression) is a key source of inconsistency in state repressive policies.

In addition to a general response to dissent, state elites decide more specifically how much repression to employ in response to violent and non-violent tactics. We look at the responses to violence and non-violence separately because states will take the type of dissent into consideration when determining a repressive response, especially if they want to curtail

one type of dissent. We assume states would like to minimize dissent, and violent dissent in particular as it is costly to the state. Beyond this preference, particular states can vary in their willingness to use repression, from those who readily employ repression to those who use repression with extreme reservation. Several factors are likely to play into elite preferences about repression of violent and non-violent dissent. In general, states appear to use repression more readily in response to violent dissent, no doubt because it is easier to justify to relevant audiences than repression of non-violent dissent and perhaps because it poses a greater threat to the state. Certain aspects of the dissident group or dissent activity in question may also affect the state's repressive response.^x The state may perceive some benefit from repression, for instance, if it limits the extent to which the challenging group uses violence to press its demands in the future. It may receive an additional benefit if its repression of one group discourages certain protest tactics on the part of other challenging groups.^{xi} Dissidents will generally know if their state favors repression or not but state attitudes toward repression can also change quickly, making it necessary that dissidents update their estimations of the repression-based costs of dissent.^{xii}

This Rational Actor framework is a commonly used model of dissent. One of the central findings from this model is the substitution hypothesis, which posits that repression of one dissent tactic will raise the costs of that tactic and induce dissidents to substitute the other alternative. Put another way, states can make dissidents use more violence by increasing the costs of non-violence through repression and vice versa.^{xiii}

Substitution hypotheses:

H₁: Controlling for state repression of non-violence, increasing state repression of violence will *decrease* the likelihood of violence relative to non-violence.

H₂: Controlling for state repression of violence, increasing state repression of non-violence will *decrease* the likelihood of non-violence relative to violence.

We do not disagree with these predictions, but studies of the substitution hypothesis do not take into account the consistency of repression which should affect the costs/benefit analysis that lead dissidents to substitute tactics. The next section will explain how consistency of repression should affect dissent strategies and build on these original substitution hypotheses.

Consistency of Repression and its Effects

Consistency refers to the variation in how frequently repression is employed to the same dissent tactic, distinct from the level of repression the state employs.^{xiv} For example, if riots are met with force at some times but not others, the state is responding inconsistently, regardless of whether force is employed at high or low levels on the occasions when repression is used.^{xv}

State elites decide on a level of repression in response to dissent, but the consistency of such responses can be compromised for two reasons. First, the actual process of repressing involves a potential principle-agent problem. State elites decide that some act(s) of dissent warrant a repressive response. They dispatch security forces (police or military) to carry out the repression. Security forces engage in repressive tactics with varying degrees of oversight, leadership and self-restraint. The less clear the policy directing a repressive response is and the less oversight of the execution of the policy, the more room for discretion there will be among the security forces physically responding. This allows security forces (the agents) to enact state policy to varying degrees in different situations, creating inconsistency in the state's overall response to dissent activities.^{xvi}

A second source of inconsistency in state responses to dissent is the multiple constraints states' have on their behavior beyond their interaction with a particular group of

dissidents. Scott Gartner and Patrick Regan argue that the decision to repress is constrained by both domestic and international factors.^{xvii} Such factors might include domestic political considerations (elections, other dissent actors), external threats (war on terror, international war), or characteristics of the government (change in leadership, coalition governments) which can affect both the willingness and capacity of states to employ repression. The particular domestic and international factors confronting a state at any point in time may affect their ability and willingness to use (or refrain from using) repression and may change quickly. Christian Davenport also identifies attributes of dissident behavior that may influence the likelihood of encountering repression.^{xviii} Moreover, Borphy-Baermann and Conybear (1994) introduce the possibility that governments make discretionary, as opposed to rule-based, decisions about repression, which would likely lead to inconsistencies in state policy.^{xix} Both principle-agent problems and the complex nature of the state's decision calculus with respect to repression invite the possibility that some states will be more consistent than others, or more consistent at varying points in time, in their use of repression.

Several questions emerge from thinking about states using repression inconsistently. If states repress one tactic (violence or non-violence), but do so inconsistently, will the dissidents substitute the other one as Lichbach and Moore suggest?^{xx} Moreover, is the effect of inconsistency conditional on the type of dissent tactic to which it applies?

We argue that the primary effect of inconsistency on dissidents' tactical choices will be to mute the deterrent qualities of repression that lead dissidents to substitute tactics. The central proposition by Lichbach and Moore is that the state can induce dissidents to shift tactics (violent to non-violent or vice versa) by increasing the relative costs associated with each tactic. However, dissidents must estimate the costs they will incur through past

interaction with the state. When that state behavior is erratic, it sends a muddy signal to dissidents making it hard to assess the likely costs of their actions. As such, an inconsistent use of repression will not clearly signal that costs to dissent will be higher, or that there is some chance of repression, but it is not a certainty. This leads us to the following hypotheses about dissent strategy:

Conditional substitution hypotheses:

Hypotheses 1 and 2 argue that all else held constant, the repression of one dissent tactic will increase the dissidents' use of the other. This effect should vary depending on the degree of consistency with which repression is used.

H₃: Controlling for state repression of non-violence, as repression of violence becomes less consistent, the substitution effect of repression will *decrease*.

H₄: Controlling for state repression of non-violence, as repression of non-violence becomes less consistent, the substitution effect of repression will *decrease*.

Testing the Effects of Inconsistency on Dissent

To evaluate these hypotheses, we employ both a quantitative analysis of dissent behavior in a set of European cases and an illustrative case study of repression and dissent in Northern Ireland.

Our quantitative tests examine the effects of repression on dissident tactics conditional on the consistency of repression in a set of European countries from 1980 – 1995. We use a dataset of 24 protesting minority groups in 16 countries. To reiterate, our theory speaks to a subset of openly dissident populations, and we seek to understand why some groups use more violent or non-violent tactics, and how the consistency of state repression affects this choice. Although the theory could apply more broadly to any disaffected group in any state, we have selected a sample of somewhat comparable dissident

groups by focusing on minority populations that all have grievances against the state. The sample represents any minority groups that engaged in protest during the time period in question, and are recognized as “at risk” minorities.^{xxi} The decision to limit the scope of this analysis to European countries was a function of available data, but it has the advantage of providing some control for regime type. Essentially, then, we are testing our theory of dissent and repression on minority protest in European democracies.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable captures the relative use of violent or non-violent tactics in dissent behavior. Though many studies focus on when actors employ violence against the state and when they do not, this dichotomous characterization is neither empirically supported nor does it follow from the theoretical model we have outlined here. Dissidents choose to employ some level of violent dissent, often in conjunction with some level of non-violent dissent. To capture the strategy choices that dissidents make, we have designed a dependent variable that measures the dissidents’ relative use of non-violent or violent protest, which we call *dissent strategy*. This measure indicates the relative amount of effort (event days) being devoted to non-violent versus violent activities in a given month weighted by the total number of dissent events. The formula is

$$dissent\ strategy = ((nve - ve) \div te) \times 100$$

Where nve= Number of non-violent events,

ve = Number of violent events, and

te= Total number of events

Dissent strategy ranges from -100, totally violent, to 100, totally non-violent. A group that perfectly balances non-violent and violent activities in a given month has a score of zero for

dissent strategy. Months with no protest activity are excluded from the analysis as our focus here is on protest strategy choices, not the decision of whether or not to protest.

“Violent” protest activity includes a range of actions such as armed attacks, hostage-taking, vandalism and riots. “Non-violent” protest activities include demonstrations, rallies, and symbolic acts, among others. A full list of actions and their coding are available from the authors. Some actions were more difficult to designate as violent or non-violent – such as vandalism. Our general rule is that any action involving damage to property or bodily harm is considered violent. The raw data from which we constructed our strategy measure codes daily protest and coercion events. Ongoing events, such as hostage crises, are coded for each day they are ongoing.^{xxii} The average *dissent strategy* score for all minorities in the dataset is -34, indicating that as a whole, there is more violent protest activity than non-violent protest.

Independent Variables

In order to estimate the likely costs of dissent, we assume dissidents look at how repressive the state was to their various dissent tactics in the past. To construct a measure of repression costs that captures this process, we create a variable that indicates the average number of repressive actions undertaken by the state in response to each dissent tactic (violent and non-violent dissent) in the previous 12 months (this is a rolling average).^{xxiii} Repressive actions include coercive activity directed toward the dissenting group such as arrests and raids. In order to establish whether the state was responding to violent or non-violent dissent, we designate each month of dissent as a relatively violent or non-violent month. “Violent” months are those where the group’s *dissent strategy* value is lower than its average for the overall timeframe. Likewise, “non-violent” months are those where the

group's *dissent strategy* value is higher than its overall average. By using the group average to determine relative non-violent or violent protest, we can account for changes in strategy across groups that have very different dissent strategies on average. Having established a designation of violent or non-violent dissent activity and information about the repressive responses for that month, we construct the rolling averages of repression to violent and non-violent dissent in the previous 12 months (variable name: *repression*).

To capture consistency of repression, we construct a measure of the variance in the state's repressive responses to violent and non-violent dissent over the previous 12 months.^{xxiv} Using the same data used to construct our rolling averages of repressive responses to violent or non-violent dissent, we calculate standard deviations of those rolling averages. We call this variable *inconsistency*.^{xxv} The greater the value of *inconsistency*, the less consistent the state has been in its application of repression to dissent.

Findings

To assess the conditional effects of repression and the consistency of its application on dissent tactics, we employ a series of ordinary least squared regressions on *dissent strategy*. Table 1 reports the results of these regressions. The models examine the effects of repression of violent and non-violent dissent conditional on the consistency of repression. Model 1 shows the conditional effect of repression of violent tactics on *dissent strategy*. This regression includes measures of the level of recent repression, the consistency of this repression, an interaction term of these two variables, and controls for repression of non-violent tactics and consistency of repression of non-violent activity. Model 2 is similar but examines the conditional effect of repression of non-violent dissent controlling for the use and consistency of repression of violence. If, as hypotheses one and two suggests, the

effects of repression of one tactic is to induce substitution of the other tactic, we should observe that the effect of repression of violence is to decrease the relative use of violence and the repression of non-violence is to decrease the relative use of non-violence. If hypotheses three and four are correct, we should find that the effects of repression differ at varying level of consistency. Greater inconsistency in the repression should diminish the deterrent effect that leads dissidents to substitute tactics.

Table 1 about here

To interpret the effects of repression of violent and non-violent dissent and consistency of repression on the use of these tactics, we need to examine the marginal effects of repression at different levels of inconsistency. Though the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant, Brambor, Clark and Golder remind us that “it is perfectly possible for the marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for substantively relevant values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant.”^{xxvi} In terms of our analysis, this means it is possible for a statistically significant relationship to exist between varying levels of repression and dissent tactics, for relevant values of consistency of repression, even if the interaction and constituent terms are not statistically significant. Thus, we use the Brambor, Clark and Golder method for graphing the marginal effects of repression on dissent tactics over the range of values for level of inconsistency. Figures 1 and 2 show this graphically for Models 1 and 2. Both indicate a statistically significant conditional relationship between *repression* and *dissent strategy* where increased repression causes dissident groups to substitute tactics. The effects of

repression are conditional on the consistency of repression, though in different ways for violent and non-violent tactics.

Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 depicts the marginal impact of repression of violence on the overall strategy chosen by dissidents. It reveals three important findings. First, portions of the graph where both the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval (dashed lines) are above or below zero indicate that there is a statistically significant conditional relationship between repression of violence and dissent strategy. At these values of inconsistency (which include 92% of observations in the analysis), the conditional relationship between repression and dissent strategy is statistically significant. Second, because the marginal effects line (the solid line) is in the positive values, we know that repression does deter violence in the sense that dissidents are using more non-violent activities at higher levels of repression. Remember, the dependent variable is a scale from 100 to -100 with movement toward 100 indicating increasing use of non-violent relative to violent dissent tactics. Finally, the downward slope of the marginal effects line indicates that the marginal effects of repression become smaller as inconsistency of repression increases. This means that repression of violence is less effective at encouraging substitution of non-violent for violent dissent as it is applied less consistently.

Figure 2 about here

Figure 2 depicts the marginal effects of repression of non-violence and shows that the effects of repression vary with the consistency of repression, but in a different way than repression of violence. To interpret this graph, we look at the portions of the graph where both the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval (dashed lines) are above or below zero. At these levels of inconsistency, there is a statistically significant conditional relationship between repression of non-violence and dissent strategy. Within this range of values, from about .07 onward (about 62% of the observations in the analysis), the conditional relationship between repression and dissent strategy is statistically significant. Because the marginal effects line (the solid line) is in the negative values, we know that repression of non-violent dissent leads to a relative increase in the use of violent dissent (this supports Hypothesis 2). However, the downward slope of the marginal effects line indicates that the marginal effects of a repression of non-violence become *greater* as inconsistency of repression of non-violence increases. This is in contrast to both our expectation in Hypothesis 4 and our findings about the conditional effects of repression on violent dissent where increased inconsistency of repression mitigated the deterrent effects of repression. This leads us to reject Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the finding suggests that there are additional hazards to repressing non-violent dissent (discussed more in the conclusion) and raises the question of whether we should assume that repression will have consistent effects on violent and non-violent dissent.

Sensitivity Tests

In addition to models 1 and 2, we ran a series of sensitivity tests. Both models were run with an additional variable indicating whether any accommodation was made to dissidents in a

given month. We also clustered the observations on the minority dissident group as opposed to country. Results were similar in both cases.^{xxvii}

The trajectory of dissident behavior may also affect the dissent choices that they make in each month. Changing tactics may require additional resources that make the continuance of the same strategy more attractive (eg. they have bullets left over). Thus, we re-ran the models including both a three-month and a six-month lags to account for a more general pattern of dissent behavior. The results remained similar. Different points in time may also affect dissent choices as global or regional trends in dissent tactics change. We included dummies for decades and then for years to control for the effect of time. Again the results were not substantially different from the original models. All results from the sensitivity analyses are available from the authors.

How Inconsistency Led to More Violence in Northern Ireland

This large-n study of dissent behavior in Europe demonstrates correlation between repression and dissent and shows that the consistency of repression affects this relationship. Yet there are a number of theoretical links in our story that the quantitative study cannot show. What are the sources of inconsistency? Are dissidents examining state repression and updating their beliefs about the costs of violent and non-violent dissent? Here, a closer examination on the dissent/repression cycle over time in Northern Ireland can help to show that these mechanisms are at work, and that dissidents adjust their behavior based on the consistency of repression.

The history of Republican protest activity in Northern Ireland and responses from the state provide further support for our theory that the effects of repression on dissident groups' strategies will be conditional on the consistency with which such repression is

employed, and supplements our finding that consistency affects tactical substitution differently, depending on whether the dissent being repressed is violent or non-violent. This case also helps to illustrate a number of the micro-processes that we assume to be at work in our theory.

The period 1963-1976 is characterized as a movement for Catholic civil rights in Northern Ireland that degenerated into the Northern Irish “troubles.”^{xxviii} The start of a civil rights movement marks a shift in the strategic orientation of Catholic activists from an emphasis on armed conflict with the British (1954-62), toward a mixed strategy that emphasized non-violent dissent. This increased emphasis on non-violent dissent lasted into 1969, at which point violence began to escalate once again and continued to increase until 1973. The period 1974-76 witnessed another shift away from violent dissent back toward more non-violent protest. These shifts in dissent tactics followed changes in the consistency of state repression in response to Catholic protest activities.

As with every real-world case, the facts on the ground in Northern Ireland are far more complex than the simplified relationship we have isolated in our theory. In the stylized description that follows we have largely excluded actors such as unionist (British loyalist) paramilitary groups and the Irish state. This choice is not meant to suggest that such actors made no contribution to the dissent strategies of Northern Irish Republicans, but rather to isolate the impact of the consistency of state repression on Republican protest in Northern Ireland.

Before we can discuss the impact of repression consistency on republican dissent in Northern Ireland, one important question must be addressed: who is the “state” in this story? For this analysis we will consider responses from either the government of Northern Ireland or England. This decision was made for both empirical and theoretical reasons.

Empirically, both of these actors responded with repression to Republican dissent during the period we are examining, and had legal grounds for doing so. State responses primarily came from Northern Ireland, until they called in the British Army in 1969, then repression came from both England and Northern Ireland until England suspended Stormont, the Northern Irish parliament, in May 1972. We believe it makes sense to examine both Northern Irish and English state repression because the Northern Irish state is arguably an extension of the English state, which is certainly how it was perceived by Republican dissidents at the time. Republicans saw their struggle as a dispute with England, whether they were interacting with Westminster directly, or its façade in Stormont.

The Civil Rights Movement (1962-69)

The civil rights movement, which began to take shape in 1962, marked a period of increased non-violent protest among Catholic dissidents such as the IRA. Prior to the advent of the movement for civil rights, Republican dissidents had been involved in a prolonged “Border Campaign” of violence (1956-62) which had been met with consistent repression from the Northern Irish state, culminating in an extended period of internment without trial, which lasted until April 1961.^{xxx} Thus, the period 1962-1969 was one of a strategic shift toward non-violent protest, as consistent repression in response to violence had made violent dissent relatively more costly.

Those who favor a resource mobilization explanation for dissent strategy choices might attribute the lack of violence in this time period to a lack of resources on the part of the IRA.^{xxx} After the violent border campaign, the IRA was typically understood to have limited funding, weapons and volunteers.^{xxxi} Richard English argues, however, that throughout the period 1962-1969, the IRA was rebuilding its forces, which should have been

accompanied by an increase in violence, rather than non-violent protest, if resource mobilization explains Republican dissent strategy in this time period.^{xxxii}

Indications that a shift toward more non-violent dissent had occurred can be found in a 1966 republican editorial in *Tuairisc*, a newsletter for the Wolfe Tone Society. This editorial noted that a key obstacle to the burgeoning civil rights movement was “the illusion still current in some pockets of the republican movement that a simple-minded armed struggle against the British occupation is alone sufficient...to complete the national revolution.”^{xxxiii} At the same time that this editorial emphasized the increased importance of non-violent Republican dissent, it also acknowledged that violent dissent might still be appropriate. This qualification suggests that even as non-violent Republican dissent was increasing, violent dissent had not been abandoned altogether as a protest strategy.^{xxxiv} By mid-1968, however, the bulk of Catholic dissent activity was non-violent. The spring of 1968 witnessed a series of protest marches, and an August 1968 march is cited by some as the first “civil rights” march.^{xxxv} Marches continued throughout the fall of 1968, and near-constant protest marches are reported in Derry in November and December 1968 expanding to Newry in the first months of 1969.^{xxxvi}

The state’s use of repression in response to these new protest tactics was not consistent. Some of the earlier 1968 marches drew no repressive response from the state—the August 1968 Dungannon march, for example, was reportedly non-violent.^{xxxvii} Other times these marches were met with repression from the government, as in the October 5 March in Derry.^{xxxviii} By late 1968 and into 1969, however, the state was increasing repression of non-violent protests. A Republican march, from Belfast to Derry on the first 4 days of 1969, encountered repression that Sabine Wichert describes as “police misconduct.”^{xxxix} “Police misconduct” occurred in several more non-violent protests in 1969, and is a prime

example of the sorts of principle-agent problems that can contribute to the inconsistent application of repression.^{xi} The notion of “misconduct” suggest that individuals with the capacity to implement repression are taking matters into their own hands, rather than following a specific policy set forth by the state.

Historical accounts provide some further insight into why state repression might have been inconsistent during this time period. English notes that “by 1966 unionism was in crisis, divided between reformist and hard-line instincts.”^{xii} Terrence O’Neill assumed the office of North Irish prime minister in 1963 with a soft-line agenda.^{xiii} His inclination toward greater inclusion of Catholics, however, was necessarily balanced against opposition opinions within his own Unionist political party and pressure from key constituent groups such as the Ulster Protestant Action.^{xiiii} In 1967, O’Neill faced an attempt by his Home Minister, William Craig, to bring down his government.^{xlv} By early 1969, O’Neill was slowly losing his grip on power; Stormont was increasingly controlled by hard-line unionists. O’Neill called elections in February in an attempt to consolidate power, and was returned as prime minister, but his position remained under attack until he ultimately resigned in May 1969.^{xlv} Thus from 1963-1969, the Northern Irish government was rife with tension between the preferences of the prime minister and other key political actors, which, in addition to the aforementioned principle-agent problems of “police misconduct” further contributed to inconsistent repressive responses to non-violent protest.

The Start of the Troubles (1969-70)

Faced with inconsistent responses to non-violent protest in the previous period, Catholics increased their use of violent dissent in 1969 and 1970. A statement by the Provisional IRA, established on December 18, 1969 summarized the reasoning behind this

strategic shift. “A civil rights movement, demanding justice and reforms, had been launched ten months previously. The unionist government and its supporters attacked the movement and in a number of confrontations 3 nationalists had died at the hands of the RUC [police].”^{xlvi} The acknowledgement that the non-violent civil rights movement had been greeted with repression, which we have argued was not consistently employed, suggests that Catholic dissidents were attuned to the changing costs of each tactic and re-evaluated the relative expected utilities for different dissent strategies.

August 1969 was a time of intense violence in Northern Ireland. England increased coercion against Republicans in response to this violence by deploying the British Army. Like the responses to non-violent protest in the previous period, however, this repressive response to increasingly violent protest was not applied consistently. Principle-agent problems continued to compromise the British state’s ability to employ repression consistently as British troops employed force against Republican dissenters unevenly and the continued army occupation of this time period promoted this inconsistency.

During this time period republicans did not abandon non-violent dissent altogether, but the emphasis was clearly shifting toward violent dissent. By the spring of 1969, Republican dissidents were attacking public buildings and utilities.^{xlvii} Seasonal Protestant marches through Catholic neighborhoods were met with Republican rioting and petrol bombs.^{xlviii} August 2-3, 1969 witnessed “considerable violence in Belfast,” and on August 4 more riots broke out in Catholic neighborhoods.^{xlix} An August 12 Protestant march in Derry sparked violence between police and Catholics that spread to Belfast, ending in fires that left thousands of (predominantly Catholic) families homeless.¹ In December, 1969, the Provisional IRA was founded, suggesting a further commitment to pursue violent dissent. By spring 1970, the Provisionals were involved in attacks on Royal Ulster Constabulary

police stations, and violent confrontations with the army.^{li} By the fall of 1970, the British army reported that it felt the riots it was encountering were being carefully orchestrated.^{lii}

Repressive responses to this violent dissent were inconsistent during this time period. At times the state employed high levels of repression. On the morning of August 16, for example, the B-Specials (a police reserve force in Northern Ireland) were reported to have gone on a “rampage” in Catholic sections of Belfast in response to continued Republican violence.^{liii} But such episodes of repression occurred sporadically, and British MPs described the army as having a “low key” attitude.^{liv} In April 1970 the state announced that petrol bombers risked being shot and in July 1970 the state imposed “Falls Curfew” where violent house searches were performed in response to recent violent dissent. These examples of repression, however, represent punctuations in extended periods of a British military presence that was not consistently employing repression, but rather engaging in what English describes as harassment of Catholics.^{lv} Such harassment, again, represents not a consistent policy of repression on the part of the state, but rather agents of the state taking liberties with their repressive power to trouble Republicans.

Such inconsistent repression on the part of the army might actually be an inherent characteristic of military occupation when the military is not engaged in specific operations. As we have mentioned previously, principle-agent problems lead to inconsistent applications of repression. When a significant repressive presence under the control of multiple agents of the state is placed in close proximity to dissent activities, but not engaged in a specific military campaign beyond some vague notion of “peacekeeping,” the probability that repression is applied inconsistently is likely to increase dramatically.

As multiple agents of the state have a repressive capacity, and no direct instructions as to the extent to which they should employ repression, opportunities for discretionary

decisions about repressive response abound. Military occupation is a tense situation and as individual agents feel more-or-less threatened at any given time, they will respond with repression accordingly (either in a formal repressive capacity or with more informal repression, such as the harassment mentioned above). Furthermore, particular army units had distinct preferences regarding the use of repression. The Paratroopers, for example, had a reputation for the excessive use of repression, which further contributed to the overall inconsistency in the application of repression during military occupation.^{lvi}

The Troubles Continue and Begin to Subside (1971-76)

By 1971, Republican violence had increased markedly, with an increasing amount of bombing activity directed at the British Army in particular.^{lvii} Here then, we see a sequence of events where high state coercion in response to non-violence was not applied consistently, encouraging an increase in violent protest activity. The increased consistency of the state's repressive response from 1971-73, and the subsequent decrease in Republican violence that followed in 1974-76, illustrates how increased consistency in the application of repression can reduce violent dissent.

Republicans engaged in more violent dissent from 1971-73. Early in 1971, the IRA began to shoot at British troops and killed the first English soldier on February 6.^{lviii} By spring 1971 Republicans were described as bombing with “energy and intensity.”^{lix} July 1971 saw increased Republican violence in Derry and in August, 1971, lethal violence broke out in response to the state's renewed policy of internment. Over 20 people were killed, and thousands left homeless from house fires. In an August 13 press conference republican dissidents stressed their commitment to violence stating “we have plenty of guns and ammunition.”^{lx}

In the last two weeks of January, 1972, Republicans engaged in a number of shootings and planted several mail bombs. In Derry, on January 27, two RUC men were killed by Catholic dissidents. In February 1972, the Official IRA bombed a paratrooper barracks in response to Bloody Sunday; seven were killed. February 25, three days later, Republicans attempted the assassination of a Unionist politician.^{lxi} Two were killed and 136 injured in a March, 1972 bombing of a Belfast department store restaurant.^{lxii} July 21, 1972 has been described as one of the North's "worst ever days of violence" when Republicans planted over 20 bombs in the city center of Belfast, killing 9 people and injuring many more.^{lxiii}

This period also saw some non-violent protest, particularly as state repression of violence became more consistent with the use of house searches and internment. In September 5, 1971, Provisionals offered 'interim proposals' and made demands of the British government that, they claimed, would bring "immediate" peace if the British publicly accepted them.^{lxiv} In March, 1972, the IRA once again issued a series of demands to the British government, this time accompanied by a 72 hour ceasefire.^{lxv} By mid-1972, Republican dissidents were showing signs of the beginning of a strategic shift away from violent dissent. On May 29, 1972 the Official IRA suspended military action (but the Provisional IRA remained active).^{lxvi} June 13, 1972 marked a "significant" IRA press conference where the IRA publicly offered to meet the Northern Irish secretary of state and to suspend all violence for 7 days.^{lxvii} Then on June 22, 1972 a Republican ceasefire was announced, and on July 18, 1972 Republican leaders flew to London to meet with British Labour politicians.^{lxviii}

While Republicans were continuing their campaign of violent dissent in 1971 and 1972, the state grew more and more consistent in its use of repressive responses. From

February to August 1971, the state attempted to engage in a sort of tit-for-tat repressive response to republican violence.^{lxxix} House searches were another tactic of state repression in response to violence. They were performed by the army, and involved destruction of private property, including Catholic religious imagery. Approximately 250,000 house searches occurred, with increasing frequency, from 1971 to 1976.^{lxxx} In August 1971, internment was re-introduced.^{lxxxi} Between August 1971 and December 1975, there were 1,874 Republicans detained without trial.^{lxxxii} Initially British forces did not challenge Republican barricades and abdicated a presence in Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast and Derry, hotbeds of dissent activity.^{lxxxiii} Here then is evidence that state repression toward the end of 1971 had increased in consistency, but was not entirely consistent. Repression would become more consistent as houses were searched and internment progressed in 1972 and 1973. On March 14, 1972 Army soldiers killed two IRA teenagers in Derry and the leader of the official IRA was killed by the British army in April 1972.^{lxxxiv} Moreover, the state changed its policy regarding the non-patrolling of barricaded Catholic neighborhoods, which could previously have been seen as inconsistent with other repressive actions by the state. On July 31, 1972, in “Operation Motorman” the British Army reoccupied barricaded no-go areas of Derry and Belfast. All told, British soldiers killed 80 individuals in 1972.

The period 1974-76 saw increasing non-violent dissent on the part of Catholic dissidents, as state responses to violence in the previous period had grown more consistent. From 1971-1973, Republican dissidents killed 211 British Soldiers. From 1974-76 the number of British soldiers killed decreased to 73. The IRA engaged in a lengthy truce in 1975, and began to invest more in non-violent dissent, such as the *Republican News*, which became more professional and better-edited during this time period.^{lxxxv}

This period illustrates how the consistency with which the state uses repression in response to both violent and non-violent actions will have consequences for the dissent strategies that groups choose to employ. When the state employed inconsistent repression in response to non-violent civil rights protests, Northern Irish Republicans began to employ more violent dissent. Although the state employed repression in response to violent dissent, the initially inconsistent application of that repression undermined its deterrent effect. Finally, as the state began to employ repression more consistently in response to violent dissent, Republicans began to shift their strategy back to a greater emphasis on non-violent dissent.

Some scholars have argued that increased consistency of the state repression did not reduce Republican violence. Many cite the reenactment of internment (which we identify as a factor in increasingly consistent repression) as being a “spur to more violence.”^{lxvii} Before internment, in 1971, Republicans killed ten British soldiers, after internment thirty soldiers were killed. Similarly, Bloody Sunday was shown to have spawned several acts of violent retaliation. Isolated instances of state repression such as internment or bloody Sunday may have incited short-term violent responses from Republicans, but taken together, along with the other repressive activities employed by the British state during this time period, they contributed to eventual perceptions of an increased consistency in the state’s use of repression. Though the major reduction in Republican violence did not occur until 1974-76, it may have taken some period of time for dissidents in Northern Ireland to update their beliefs about how the state would respond to violence given the high level of inconsistency it displayed in the past.

The Question of Bloody Sunday

One major incident of repression and dissent during this time period has been excluded from this analysis because of the questions that surround it. The massive display of repression on “Bloody Sunday” could be understood as part of the increasingly consistent response to violent dissent, or as another inconsistent response to non-violent protest, depending on whether one believes that the events preceding soldiers opening fire and killing thirteen protesters were violent or non-violent.^{lxxvii} On Sunday, January 30, 1972, the army decided to arrest Catholic protesters following an anti-internment march that had degenerated into Republicans throwing stones at soldiers. The particular regiment charged with containing this protest was the paratroopers, who had the aforementioned reputation for excessive use of violence. While the high level of repression employed by the soldiers is not in doubt, questions still remain about the extent to which the soldiers were responding to violent or non-violent protest, which makes it difficult to say whether this particular incident is evidence of the consistent responses to violence during the period or more inconsistent responses to non-violence.

This interpretation of state repression and republican dissent has shown how the effectiveness of repression in deterring violence depends on the consistency with which such repression is employed. When the state was able to repress violent dissent consistently—as in the period directly preceding 1963, and 1972-73—Republican protesters relied more on non-violent dissent. Furthermore, the consequences of the state’s inability to repress non-violent protest consistently and the subsequent increase in violent dissent, highlight how the effects of the consistency of repression will depend on the dissent tactics to which repression is applied.

A Cautionary Story about Repression

In this chapter we have introduced a theory of dissent strategy and argued that the consistency with which a state employs repression in response to different dissent tactics should affect the choices that dissident groups make about violent and non-violent protest. In doing so, we have identified a significant determinant of dissent behavior that previous works on repression and dissent have ignored. The consistency of repression is a significant conditioning factor for the repression/dissent relationship.

This study leads us to a number of conclusions about previous work on repression and about the real world use of repression. In line with Moore's finding, this work has provided further support for the substitution hypothesis.^{lxxviii} States can cause dissidents to substitute violent and non-violent tactics by repressing one strategy (or repressing it more than the other). However, the effect is conditional on the consistency of this repression. Looking at the repression of violent and non-violent dissent in turn, we find that the effect of inconsistency is actually different depending on which tactic the state represses. More inconsistency in state repression of violence reduces the effect that repression has in deterring the use of violence. However, greater inconsistency in repression of non-violent tactics appears to accentuate the effect of repression on inducing dissidents to use violence. Although the directional effects on tactical substitution are different if the state is inconsistently repressing violent or non-violent protest, the consequences of that inconsistency are actually the same: to encourage more violent dissent.

This interesting finding on the different effects of inconsistency on the repression/dissent relationship between violent and non-violent tactics raises some additional questions and has important implications for policy. The Rational Actor dissent model assumes that there is nothing inherently different about violent or non-violent tactics.

Perhaps this is a problematic assumption. One idea about how tactics may differ is based on the general cost expectations associated with different dissent tactics. If the costs associated with violent dissent are routinely higher than those associated with non-violent tactics, dissidents will have different expectations or priors about those costs (high for violence, low for non-violence). Given these prior expectations, dissidents may view inconsistency of repression in different ways. For example, if predominantly violent dissidents observe that some of their actions are not met with repression, they will see that the costs are potentially lower for further violent activities. However, if predominantly non-violent dissidents expect little repression, an occasional attack by the state may be seen as particularly unjust and can engender more radical tactics.^{lxxix}

There are several important implications of these findings about consistency of repression. First, even though consistent repression might seem desirable, the principle-agent problems inherent in the implementation of repression, as well as the numerous and changing constraints on the state's decision calculus, present the potential for inconsistency. This will be true even when consistency is a goal pursued by the state. Making a comparison between the consistent use of repression and an inconsistent use assumes that states can be totally consistent, which is incorrect. We offer two explanations for why states would be inconsistent – diverse aims of state elites and a principle-agent problem associated with how repression is carried out. To what degree these two factors affect the ability of states to consistently use repression will vary across states and across time or dispute within states. However, there is little reason to believe that any state would be free of these constraints. All state elites have numerous issues to grapple with at the national level. All states must use security forces to employ repression. Thus, when we consider these findings that

inconsistent repression causes more violence, we need to think beyond the extreme and simple conclusion that states should repress consistently all the time to deter violence.

Instead, a more nuanced reading of these findings presents us with a cautionary story about the use of repression and how it is employed. First, repression of non-violent dissent encourages violence and repressing inconsistently does so even more. Though we expected inconsistency to diminish the effects of repression here, a haphazard or intermittent response to non-violence encourages even more violence. Second, repression of violent dissent can deter violence, but the effect is substantially diminished when repression is used inconsistently. The question then becomes, how useful is it to repress dissent? We should qualify this cautionary tale about repression, however. This dynamic is most likely to exist in already open political systems, where violent and non-violent dissent are both viable strategies for disaffected groups in society. Implicit in our model is the idea that accommodation *can* occur in response to either strategy, and thus dissident elites seriously consider both violent and non-violent tactics. That said, the increasing use of terrorism and violence in democracies means that state repression in these cases is a live and relevant concern today.^{lxxx}

Finally, forward looking state elites must be careful about repression decisions as a consistent policy of repression today does not guarantee consistency into the future. The central message for states regarding repressive responses to dissent, therefore, is to proceed with caution. Any forward-thinking state elites concerned with violent dissent in the future must realize that the use of repression brings with it inherent potential for inconsistent application, which will only serve to encourage violent dissent.

Tables and Figures

Table 1. OLS Regression on DV: Relative use of violent vs. non-violent dissent

<i>Regressor</i>	Model 1	s.e.	Model 2	s.e.
Level of Repression of Violence	30.91*	3.06	37.89*	3.46
Inconsistency of Repression of Violence	-23.32	12.18	-33.28*	8.22
Inconsistency*Repression of Violence	-5.94	4.32		
Level of Repression of Non-violence	-6.10	9.24	-5.86	9.68
Inconsistency of Repression of Non-violence	-0.32	10.27	9.26	4.23
Inconsistency*Repression of Non-violence			-8.45	5.75
Constant	-57.76	6.89	-60.66	9.51
R-squared ^{lxxxii}	0.04		0.05	
N	316		316	

*indicates statistically significant at .05 level




Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Repression of Violent Dissident on Dissent Strategy




Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Repression of Non-violent Dissent on Dissident Strategy

ⁱ Authors are listed in reverse alphabetical order. Equal authorship is implied.

ⁱⁱ See Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass political violence: a cross-national causal analysis* (New York, Wiley, 1973); Mark Irving Lichbach and Ted Robert Gurr, “The Conflict Process: A Formal Model,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 1 (March 1981): 3-29; Eduard A. Ziegenhagen, *The Regulation of Political Conflict* (Praeger Publishers, 1986); Ronald A. Francisco, “Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States,” *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 4 (November 1996): 1179-1204; Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 1-23; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

ⁱⁱⁱ An important exception to this is Karen Rasler’s study of repression in Iran. Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution,” *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (February 1996): 132-152.

^{iv} This follows on Lichbach (1987). Mark Irving Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, no. 2 (June 1987): 266-297.

^v Ibid.

^{vi} There is some possibility that certain challenging groups might perceive state repression to be a benefit to their cause, but such a benefit is clearly a means to some other desired policy end. This may be the case if, for example, it makes domestic audiences or outside supporters more sympathetic to the group’s cause. In such cases, the cost of state repression might be mitigated to some degree by the perceived short-term benefit. It is unlikely, however, that even groups who view state repression as beneficial to their cause in the short term also see that repression as totally costless. In other words we do not believe that any dissident group finds repression to be purely beneficial.

^{vii} Ibid.

^{viii} We can think about the mix of violent and non-violent dissent that a challenging group ultimately chooses in various ways: the number of different activities being undertaken, the number of individuals involved in these activities, or the number of days in which dissent occurs. In our analysis we examine dissent activities as the relative number of dissent activities (violent and non-violent), counted as distinct protest events and the number of days protest takes place.

^{ix} Though preserving the status quo is the goal, we know empirically that repression can also work to galvanize the challenging group and inspire more violence, as Karen Rasler suggests it did in Iran. Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution.”

^x Davenport (1996) finds that various aspects of dissent including frequency, range of tactics, and deviance of dissent from culturally accepted norms will all affect the state’s decision to employ repression. Christian Davenport, “The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression,” *Political Research Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (1996): 377-403.

^{xi} Barbara F Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (2006): 313-330.

^{xiii} Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Violence and Uncertainty in Transitions,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 2 (April 1999): 192-212.

^{xiii} This was first articulated by Lichbach then tested by Moore. Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”; Will H Moore, “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing,” *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (July 1998): 851-873.

^{xiv} We could also think about consistency as just a variable level of repression ranging from none to high levels. We have chosen to examine consistency distinct from a level of repression because it may have different effects at different levels of repression. An advantage of our approach is that the level of response may be dictated by the level of violence or by the scope of protest. In that case, different levels of repression could be understood to be inconsistent behavior when in reality they are designed to respond to different levels of dissent behavior.

^{xv} Lichbach (1987) also discusses inconsistency in his RA model, but his notion is somewhat different than ours in that it refers to the use of repression *and* accommodation in response to dissent.

^{xvi} In particular, periods of occupation or peacekeeping leave a great deal of room for the inconsistent application of repression.

^{xvii} Scott Sigmund Gartner and Patrick M. Regan, “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 3 (August 1996): 273-287.

^{xviii} Davenport (1996) finds that various aspects of dissent including frequency, range of tactics, and deviance of dissent from culturally accepted norms will all affect the state’s decision to employ repression. Christian Davenport, “The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression,” *Political Research Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (1996): 377-403.

^{xix} Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John A. C. Conybeare, “Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion,” *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (February 1994): 196-210.

^{xx} Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”; Moore, “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing.”

^{xxi} Protest data comes from Ron Francisco’s European Protest and Coercion Data, the “at risk” characterization of minority groups comes from the Minorities at Risk data set.

^{xxii} See Ron Francisco’s Codebook for European Protest and Coercion Data for a full description of the event data coding at <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>.

^{xxiii} For a few cases, the group's average dissent strategy was the minimum or maximum. In these cases, each month is considered violent or non-violent, respectively.

^{xxiv} Wright and Goldberg (1985) discuss the use of variance to gauge uncertainty, asserting that "The greater the variance, the less confident one would be about another's likely behavior." (705). We focus this idea specifically on the cost term in an expected utility calculation. John R. Wright and Arthur S. Goldberg, "Risk and Uncertainty as Factors in the Durability of Political Coalitions," *The American Political Science Review* 79, no. 3 (September 1985): 704-718.

^{xxv} In cases where there was only one instance of violent or non-violent dissent in the previous 12 months, the *inconsistency* variable is not calculated.

^{xxvi} Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," *Political Analysis* 14, no. 1 (2006): 63-82, p. 74.

^{xxvii} In each of the sensitivity test model, we graphed the marginal effects of repression as we have done in Figures 1 and 2. For each, the relationship is statistically significant for approximately the same levels of inconsistency, the coefficients are similar in size and sign, and the direction of the marginal effects line is the same. Thus, we find the same conditional relationships between repression of the different dissent strategies and dissent choice hold across these models.

^{xxviii} Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003).

^{xxix} *Ibid.*, p. 73.

^{xxx} For a summary of resource mobilization hypotheses, see J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527-553.

^{xxxi} English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 83.

^{xxxii} *Ibid.*, p. 84.

^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, p. 89.

^{xxxiv} This same editorial provides some indication that groups actually may evaluate costs and benefits in the manner we have suggested. It cited "historical experience" as justification for their advocacy of increased non-violence with the option for future violent dissent to remain open. *Ibid.*

^{xxxv} Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945*, 2nd ed. (Longman, 1999), p. 108.

^{xxxvi} *Ibid.*, p. 109-10.

xxxvii English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 100.

xxxviii This particular instance of state repression resulted in 2 days of violent protest rioting – an example of how higher repression in response to non-violence might make violent dissent relatively more attractive.

xxxix Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945*, p. 110.

xl Ibid.

xli English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 90.

xlii Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945*, p. 89.

xliii Ibid., p. 94.

xliv Ibid., p. 99.

xlv Ibid., p. 111.

xlvi English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 126.

xlvii Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945*, p. 111.

xlviii Marc Mulholland, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland's Troubled History* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), p. 71.

xlix English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 101.

¹ Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945*, p. 112.

li Ibid., p. 134.

lii Ibid., p. 137.

liii Ibid., p. 103.

liv Ibid., p. 148.

lv English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 122-23.

lvi Ibid., p. 154.

lvii Mulholland, *The Longest War*, p. 87.

lviii English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 137.

lix Ibid., p. 138.

lx Ibid., p. 140.

lxi Ibid., p. 175.

lxii Ibid., p. 156.

^{lxxiii} Ibid., p. 158.

^{lxxiv} Ibid., p. 127.

^{lxxv} Ibid., p. 155.

^{lxxvi} Ibid., p. 175.

^{lxxvii} Ibid., p. 157.

^{lxxviii} Ibid., p. 157-8.

^{lxxix} Ibid., p. 173.

^{lxxx} Mulholland, *The Longest War*, p. 97.

^{lxxxi} English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 140.

^{lxxxii} Mulholland, *The Longest War*, p. 97.

^{lxxxiii} Ibid., p. 74-9.

^{lxxxiv} Ibid., p. 160, 175.

^{lxxxv} Ibid., p. 173, 181.

^{lxxxvi} Ibid., p. 141.

^{lxxxvii} English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 149.

^{lxxxviii} Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing."

^{lxxxix} This is similar to the effect Rasler finds in Iran. Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution."

^{lxxx} See Erica Chenoweth, "The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence," *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, Discussion Paper, (November 2006).

^{lxxx} Adjusted R-squared values are not reported for regressions with clustered standard errors.